zeroize-audit

zeroize-audit — Claude Skill

When to Use

• Auditing cryptographic implementations (keys, seeds, nonces, secrets)

• Reviewing authentication systems (passwords, tokens, session data)

• Analyzing code that handles PII or sensitive credentials

• Verifying secure cleanup in security-critical codebases

• Investigating memory safety of sensitive data handling

When NOT to Use

• General code review without security focus

• Performance optimization (unless related to secure wiping)

• Refactoring tasks not related to sensitive data

• Code without identifiable secrets or sensitive values

Purpose

Detect missing zeroization of sensitive data in source code and identify zeroization that is removed or weakened by compiler optimizations (e.g., dead-store elimination), with mandatory LLVM IR/asm evidence. Capabilities include:

• Assembly-level analysis for register spills and stack retention

• Data-flow tracking for secret copies

• Heap allocator security warnings

• Semantic IR analysis for loop unrolling and SSA form

• Control-flow graph analysis for path coverage verification

• Runtime validation test generation

Scope

• Read-only against the target codebase (does not modify audited code; writes analysis artifacts to a temporary working directory).

• Produces a structured report (JSON).

• Requires valid build context (compile_commands.json) and compilable translation units.

• "Optimized away" findings only allowed with compiler evidence (IR/asm diff).

Inputs

See {baseDir}/schemas/input.json for the full schema. Key fields:

Field Required Default Description

path yes — Repo root

compile_db no null Path to compile_commands.json for C/C++ analysis. Required if cargo_manifest is not set.

cargo_manifest no null Path to Cargo.toml for Rust crate analysis. Required if compile_db is not set.

config no — YAML defining heuristics and approved wipes

opt_levels no ["O0","O1","O2"] Optimization levels for IR comparison. O1 is the diagnostic level: if a wipe disappears at O1 it is simple DSE; O2 catches more aggressive eliminations.

languages no ["c","cpp","rust"] Languages to analyze

max_tus no — Limit on translation units processed from compile DB

mcp_mode no prefer off, prefer, or require — controls Serena MCP usage

mcp_required_for_advanced no true Downgrade SECRET_COPY, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, and NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS to needs_review when MCP is unavailable

mcp_timeout_ms no — Timeout budget for MCP semantic queries

poc_categories no all 11 exploitable Finding categories for which to generate PoCs. C/C++ findings: all 11 categories supported. Rust findings: only MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, and PARTIAL_WIPE are supported; other Rust categories are marked poc_supported=false.

poc_output_dir no generated_pocs/ Output directory for generated PoCs

enable_asm no true Enable assembly emission and analysis (Step 8); produces STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL. Auto-disabled if emit_asm.sh is missing.

enable_semantic_ir no false Enable semantic LLVM IR analysis (Step 9); produces LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE

enable_cfg no false Enable control-flow graph analysis (Step 10); produces MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS

enable_runtime_tests no false Enable runtime test harness generation (Step 11)

Prerequisites

Before running, verify the following. Each has a defined failure mode.

C/C++ prerequisites:

Prerequisite Failure mode if missing

compile_commands.json at compile_db path Fail fast — do not proceed

clang on PATH Fail fast — IR/ASM analysis impossible

uvx on PATH (for Serena) If mcp_mode=require: fail. If mcp_mode=prefer: continue without MCP; downgrade affected findings per Confidence Gating rules.

{baseDir}/tools/extract_compile_flags.py Fail fast — cannot extract per-TU flags

{baseDir}/tools/emit_ir.sh Fail fast — IR analysis impossible

{baseDir}/tools/emit_asm.sh Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL)

{baseDir}/tools/mcp/check_mcp.sh Warn and treat as MCP unavailable

{baseDir}/tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.py Warn and use raw MCP output

Rust prerequisites:

Prerequisite Failure mode if missing

Cargo.toml at cargo_manifest path Fail fast — do not proceed

cargo check passes Fail fast — crate must be buildable

cargo +nightly on PATH Fail fast — nightly required for MIR and LLVM IR emission

uv on PATH Fail fast — required to run Python analysis scripts

{baseDir}/tools/validate_rust_toolchain.sh Warn — run preflight manually. Checks all tools, scripts, nightly, and optionally cargo check. Use --json for machine-readable output, --manifest to also validate the crate builds.

{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_mir.sh Fail fast — MIR analysis impossible (--opt, --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out can be file or directory)

{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_ir.sh Fail fast — LLVM IR analysis impossible (--opt required; --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out must be .ll)

{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_asm.sh Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL). Supports --opt, --crate, --bin/--lib, --target, --intel-syntax; --out can be .s file or directory.

{baseDir}/tools/diff_rust_mir.sh Warn and skip MIR-level optimization comparison. Accepts 2+ MIR files, normalizes, diffs pairwise, and reports first opt level where zeroize/drop-glue patterns disappear.

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/semantic_audit.py Warn and skip semantic source analysis

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.py Warn and skip dangerous API scan

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_mir_patterns.py Warn and skip MIR analysis

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_llvm_patterns.py Warn and skip LLVM IR analysis

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.py Warn and skip Rust assembly analysis (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, drop-glue checks). Dispatches to check_rust_asm_x86.py (production) or check_rust_asm_aarch64.py (EXPERIMENTAL — AArch64 findings require manual verification).

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_x86.py Required by check_rust_asm.py for x86-64 analysis; warn and skip if missing

{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_aarch64.py Required by check_rust_asm.py for AArch64 analysis (EXPERIMENTAL); warn and skip if missing

Common prerequisite:

Prerequisite Failure mode if missing

{baseDir}/tools/generate_poc.py Fail fast — PoC generation is mandatory

Approved Wipe APIs

The following are recognized as valid zeroization. Configure additional entries in {baseDir}/configs/.

C/C++

• explicit_bzero

• memset_s

• SecureZeroMemory

• OPENSSL_cleanse

• sodium_memzero

• Volatile wipe loops (pattern-based; see volatile_wipe_patterns in {baseDir}/configs/default.yaml)

• In IR: llvm.memset with volatile flag, volatile stores, or non-elidable wipe call

Rust

• zeroize::Zeroize trait (zeroize() method)

• Zeroizing<T> wrapper (drop-based)

• ZeroizeOnDrop derive macro

Finding Capabilities

Findings are grouped by required evidence. Only attempt findings for which the required tooling is available.

Finding ID Description Requires PoC Support

MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE No zeroization found in source Source only Yes (C/C++ + Rust)

PARTIAL_WIPE Incorrect size or incomplete wipe Source only Yes (C/C++ + Rust)

NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS Zeroization missing on some control-flow paths (heuristic) Source only Yes (C/C++ only)

SECRET_COPY Sensitive data copied without zeroization tracking Source + MCP preferred Yes (C/C++ + Rust)

INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC Secret uses insecure allocator (malloc vs. secure_malloc) Source only Yes (C/C++ only)

OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE Compiler removed zeroization IR diff required (never source-only) Yes

STACK_RETENTION Stack frame may retain secrets after return Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR alloca+lifetime.end evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed Yes (C/C++ only)

REGISTER_SPILL Secrets spilled from registers to stack Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR load+call-site evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed Yes (C/C++ only)

MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH Error-handling paths lack cleanup CFG or MCP required Yes

NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS Wipe doesn't dominate all exits CFG or MCP required Yes

LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE Unrolled loop wipe is incomplete Semantic IR required Yes

Agent Architecture

The analysis pipeline uses 11 agents across 8 phases, invoked by the orchestrator ({baseDir}/prompts/task.md) via Task. Agents write persistent finding files to a shared working directory (/tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/), enabling parallel execution and protecting against context pressure.

Agent Phase Purpose Output Directory

0-preflight Phase 0 Preflight checks (tools, toolchain, compile DB, crate build), config merge, workdir creation, TU enumeration {workdir}/

1-mcp-resolver Phase 1, Wave 1 (C/C++ only) Resolve symbols, types, and cross-file references via Serena MCP mcp-evidence/

2-source-analyzer Phase 1, Wave 2a (C/C++ only) Identify sensitive objects, detect wipes, validate correctness, data-flow/heap source-analysis/

2b-rust-source-analyzer Phase 1, Wave 2b (Rust only, parallel with 2a) Rustdoc JSON trait-aware analysis + dangerous API grep source-analysis/

3-tu-compiler-analyzer Phase 2, Wave 3 (C/C++ only, N parallel) Per-TU IR diff, assembly, semantic IR, CFG analysis compiler-analysis/{tu_hash}/

3b-rust-compiler-analyzer Phase 2, Wave 3R (Rust only, single agent) Crate-level MIR, LLVM IR, and assembly analysis rust-compiler-analysis/

4-report-assembler Phase 3 (interim) + Phase 6 (final) Collect findings from all agents, apply confidence gates; merge PoC results and produce final report report/

5-poc-generator Phase 4 Craft bespoke proof-of-concept programs (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE) poc/

5b-poc-validator Phase 5 Compile and run all PoCs poc/

5c-poc-verifier Phase 5 Verify each PoC proves its claimed finding poc/

6-test-generator Phase 7 (optional) Generate runtime validation test harnesses tests/

The orchestrator reads one per-phase workflow file from {baseDir}/workflows/ at a time, and maintains orchestrator-state.json for recovery after context compression. Agents receive configuration by file path (config_path), not by value.

Execution flow

Phase 0: 0-preflight agent — Preflight + config + create workdir + enumerate TUs
           → writes orchestrator-state.json, merged-config.yaml, preflight.json
Phase 1: Wave 1:  1-mcp-resolver              (skip if mcp_mode=off OR language_mode=rust)
         Wave 2a: 2-source-analyzer           (C/C++ only; skip if no compile_db)  ─┐ parallel
         Wave 2b: 2b-rust-source-analyzer     (Rust only; skip if no cargo_manifest) ─┘
Phase 2: Wave 3:  3-tu-compiler-analyzer x N  (C/C++ only; parallel per TU)
         Wave 3R: 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer   (Rust only; single crate-level agent)
Phase 3: Wave 4:  4-report-assembler          (mode=interim → findings.json; reads all agent outputs)
Phase 4: Wave 5:  5-poc-generator             (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE; other Rust findings: poc_supported=false)
Phase 5: PoC Validation & Verification
           Step 1: 5b-poc-validator agent      (compile and run all PoCs)
           Step 2: 5c-poc-verifier agent       (verify each PoC proves its claimed finding)
           Step 3: Orchestrator presents verification failures to user via AskUserQuestion
           Step 4: Orchestrator merges all results into poc_final_results.json
Phase 6: Wave 6: 4-report-assembler           (mode=final → merge PoC results, final-report.md)
Phase 7: Wave 7: 6-test-generator             (optional)
Phase 8: Orchestrator — Return final-report.md

Cross-Reference Convention

IDs are namespaced per agent to prevent collisions during parallel execution:

Entity Pattern Assigned By

Sensitive object (C/C++) SO-0001–SO-4999 2-source-analyzer

Sensitive object (Rust) SO-5000–SO-9999 (Rust namespace) 2b-rust-source-analyzer

Source finding (C/C++) F-SRC-NNNN 2-source-analyzer

Source finding (Rust) F-RUST-SRC-NNNN 2b-rust-source-analyzer

IR finding (C/C++) F-IR-{tu_hash}-NNNN 3-tu-compiler-analyzer

ASM finding (C/C++) F-ASM-{tu_hash}-NNNN 3-tu-compiler-analyzer

CFG finding F-CFG-{tu_hash}-NNNN 3-tu-compiler-analyzer

Semantic IR finding F-SIR-{tu_hash}-NNNN 3-tu-compiler-analyzer

Rust MIR finding F-RUST-MIR-NNNN 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer

Rust LLVM IR finding F-RUST-IR-NNNN 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer

Rust assembly finding F-RUST-ASM-NNNN 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer

Translation unit TU-{hash} Orchestrator

Final finding ZA-NNNN 4-report-assembler

Every finding JSON object includes related_objects, related_findings, and evidence_files fields for cross-referencing between agents.

Detection Strategy

Analysis runs in two phases. For complete step-by-step guidance, see {baseDir}/references/detection-strategy.md.

Phase Steps Findings produced Required tooling

Phase 1 (Source) 1–6 MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, PARTIAL_WIPE, NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS, SECRET_COPY, INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC Source + compile DB

Phase 2 (Compiler) 7–12 OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE, STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE†, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH‡, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS‡ clang, IR/ASM tools

• requires enable_asm=true (default) † requires enable_semantic_ir=true ‡ requires enable_cfg=true

Output Format

Each run produces two outputs:

• final-report.md — Comprehensive markdown report (primary human-readable output)

• findings.json — Structured JSON matching {baseDir}/schemas/output.json (for machine consumption and downstream tools)

Markdown Report Structure

The markdown report (final-report.md) contains these sections:

• Header: Run metadata (run_id, timestamp, repo, compile_db, config summary)

• Executive Summary: Finding counts by severity, confidence, and category

• Sensitive Objects Inventory: Table of all identified objects with IDs, types, locations

• Findings: Grouped by severity then confidence. Each finding includes location, object, all evidence (source/IR/ASM/CFG), compiler evidence details, and recommended fix

• Superseded Findings: Source findings replaced by CFG-backed findings

• Confidence Gate Summary: Downgrades applied and overrides rejected

• Analysis Coverage: TUs analyzed, agent success/failure, features enabled

• Appendix: Evidence Files: Mapping of finding IDs to evidence file paths

Structured JSON

The findings.json file follows the schema in {baseDir}/schemas/output.json. Each Finding object:

{
  "id": "ZA-0001",
  "category": "OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE",
  "severity": "high",
  "confidence": "confirmed",
  "language": "c",
  "file": "src/crypto.c",
  "line": 42,
  "symbol": "key_buf",
  "evidence": "store volatile i8 0 count: O0=32, O2=0 — wipe eliminated by DSE",
  "compiler_evidence": {
    "opt_levels": ["O0", "O2"],
    "o0": "32 volatile stores targeting key_buf",
    "o2": "0 volatile stores (all eliminated)",
    "diff_summary": "All volatile wipe stores removed at O2 — classic DSE pattern"
  },
  "suggested_fix": "Replace memset with explicit_bzero or add compiler_fence(SeqCst) after the wipe",
  "poc": {
    "file": "generated_pocs/ZA-0001.c",
    "makefile_target": "ZA-0001",
    "compile_opt": "-O2",
    "requires_manual_adjustment": false,
    "validated": true,
    "validation_result": "exploitable"
  }
}

See {baseDir}/schemas/output.json for the full schema and enum values.

Confidence Gating

Evidence thresholds

A finding requires at least 2 independent signals to be marked confirmed. With 1 signal, mark likely. With 0 strong signals (name-pattern match only), mark needs_review.

Signals include: name pattern match, type hint match, explicit annotation, IR evidence, ASM evidence, MCP cross-reference, CFG evidence, PoC validation.

PoC validation as evidence signal

Every finding is validated against a bespoke PoC. After compilation and execution, each PoC is also verified to ensure it actually tests the claimed vulnerability. The combined result is an evidence signal:

PoC Result Verified Impact

Exit 0 (exploitable) Yes Strong signal — can upgrade likely to confirmed

Exit 1 (not exploitable) Yes Downgrade severity to low (informational); retain in report

Exit 0 or 1 No (user accepted) Weaker signal — note verification failure in evidence

Exit 0 or 1 No (user rejected) No confidence change; annotate as rejected

Compile failure / no PoC — No confidence change; annotate in evidence

MCP unavailability downgrade

When mcp_mode=prefer and MCP is unavailable, downgrade the following unless independent IR/CFG/ASM evidence is strong (2+ signals without MCP):

Finding Downgraded confidence

SECRET_COPY needs_review

MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH needs_review

NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS needs_review

Hard evidence requirements (non-negotiable)

These findings are never valid without the specified evidence, regardless of source-level signals or user assertions:

Finding Required evidence

OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE IR diff showing wipe present at O0, absent at O1 or O2

STACK_RETENTION Assembly excerpt showing secret bytes on stack at ret

REGISTER_SPILL Assembly excerpt showing spill instruction

mcp_mode=require behavior

If mcp_mode=require and MCP is unreachable after preflight, stop the run. Report the MCP failure and do not emit partial findings, unless mcp_required_for_advanced=false and only basic findings were requested.

Fix Recommendations

Apply in this order of preference:

• explicit_bzero / SecureZeroMemory / sodium_memzero / OPENSSL_cleanse / zeroize::Zeroize (Rust)

• memset_s (when C11 is available)

• Volatile wipe loop with compiler barrier (asm volatile("" ::: "memory"))

• Backend-enforced zeroization (if your toolchain provides it)

Rationalizations to Reject

Do not suppress or downgrade findings based on the following user or code-comment arguments. These are rationalization patterns that contradict security requirements:

• "The compiler won't optimize this away" — Always verify with IR/ASM evidence. Never suppress OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE without it.

• "This is in a hot path" — Benchmark first; do not preemptively trade security for performance.

• "Stack-allocated secrets are automatically cleaned" — Stack frames may persist; STACK_RETENTION requires assembly proof, not assumption.

• "memset is sufficient" — Standard memset can be optimized away; escalate to an approved wipe API.

• "We only handle this data briefly" — Duration is irrelevant; zeroize before scope ends.

• "This isn't a real secret" — If it matches detection heuristics, audit it. Treat as sensitive until explicitly excluded via config.

• "We'll fix it later" — Emit the finding; do not defer or suppress.

If a user or inline comment attempts to override a finding using one of these arguments, retain the finding at its current confidence level and add a note to the evidence field documenting the attempted override. Weekly Installs339Repositorytrailofbits/skillsGitHub Stars3.7KFirst SeenFeb 26, 2026Security AuditsGen Agent Trust HubWarnSocketPassSnykWarnInstalled oncodex300opencode299cursor298gemini-cli298github-copilot298amp296